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‘Between norms and practicalities’
A response to Sawitri Saharso
ANNE PHILLIPS
London School of Economics
In her article ‘Sex-selective abortion: Gender, culture and Dutch public
policy’, Sawitri Saharso makes two very important theoretical arguments,
and employs them to address a specific policy issue that has arisen in the
Netherlands. I find the general arguments compelling, and agree with her (no
change) policy recommendation. I remain unclear, however, as to the wider
implications regarding the relationship between normative and pragmatic
arguments; and my comments are largely designed to tease these out.
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The first of the general arguments is that context matters. In the resolu-
tion of morally charged policy dilemmas, we cannot expect to derive
‘correct’ policy in an easy deduction from generally shared moral principles.
There may be no shared understanding of either the principles or the
practice to which it is being applied (this is particularly likely to be the case
in a culturally plural society). Even where there is a shared understanding,
the principles may point in mutually incompatible directions (this possi-
bility has been at the heart of the so-called feminism and multiculturalism
debate). And there may be non-moral considerations that ought to be
brought to bear on the issue, considerations including history, numbers, and
the particular power relations within which a practice takes place. One
example of this last might be the ShahBano case in India, which revolved
around the application of different systems of personal law, the legal
challenge by a Muslim woman to the derisory divorce settlement she had
been granted under a particularly conservative interpretation of Islamic
law, and the subsequent highjacking of her story by Hindu fundamentalists
who used it to attack the Muslim minority. Prior to these events, many
feminists in India had argued for a uniform civil code as the best way to
promote gender equity in marriage and divorce; but afterwards, it became
difficult to make such an argument without seeming to endorse anti-Muslim
rhetoric. Context, in other words, can change the meaning of a policy. It
becomes politically irresponsible not to take this into account.
The second important argument underpinning Saharso’s analysis is that
people do not lose the capacity to act as moral agents just because they are
making their decisions under cultural constraints. When a western woman
in the Netherlands says she is too poor to have a child, her decision to abort
has clearly been made under constrained conditions (she might have
reached another conclusion had she been wealthier), but it is still typically
regarded as her decision, and one she has a ‘right’ to make. When, by
contrast, a non-western woman says the importance attached to boys in her
culture means that she cannot afford to have a girl child, her decision to
abort is more commonly regarded as subservience to ‘a culturally imposed
demand’; she is therefore to be protected from the pressures of her culture,
rather than protected in her right to decide. There seems to be a presump-
tion here that people can act autonomously when they are bowing to
economic necessity, but not when bowing to cultural expectations; and one
of the central points I take from Saharso’s article is that this feeds, in
worrying ways, into a hierarchy of western versus non-western culture. We
cannot, she suggests, attribute moral agency as and when suits our purpose.
We cannot wriggle out of the respect for women’s autonomy by refusing to
believe that a woman seeking the abortion of a female foetus really wants
what she says she wants. This edges far too close to saying we will not
believe a woman is ‘choosing’ if what she chooses is at odds with majority
beliefs.
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I find these points both important and compelling. I also find myself
convinced by the specific policy conclusion reached in the article, that it is
better to leave existing abortion legislation alone. But I am left unclear
about the structure of the argument, which seems to me to shift uneasily
between normative and policy concerns.
Sometimes, the article seems to be addressing and problematizing
questions of justice: this is certainly what is suggested in the quote from
Joseph Carens, which calls for greater immersion in the details of each case
in order to determine ‘what justice requires’. When Saharso makes her
points about norms of sexual equality coming into conflict with norms of
women’s autonomy, or women still being moral agents even when their
decisions are culturally constrained, I read her as challenging over-
simplistic notions of what justice requires. She introduces, for example, the
idea that sex-selective abortion might constitute a moral wrong, and yet
women still have a moral right to choose it: thus that the normative case for
banning sex-selective abortion may have to be balanced by the normative
case for women’s right to choose. (Interestingly, this combination of views
commonly surfaces in views on abortion. I have never forgotten a US
survey reported by Ronald Dworkin, in which 61 percent of respondents
agreed that abortion was morally wrong, with as many as 57 percent regard-
ing it as murder, yet 74 percent still said they regarded abortion as a
decision that should be left to each woman herself (Dworkin, 1989).) In
much of her article, Saharso seems to be alerting us to complexities in
working out what is right or wrong; warning us – as she puts it in her final
comment – against ‘fixed moral positions’.
At other points, the argument is more clearly pragmatic, as when she
notes that there is little evidence that sex-selection abortion is widely
practised in the Netherlands; or argues that it would be undesirable to try
to restrict sex-selective abortion by more closely specifying the grounds on
which women can seek an abortion, because this would mean closer
scrutiny of all women requesting an abortion, and a general reduction in all
women’s autonomy. The earlier suggestion that women might have a moral
right to carry out a sex-selective abortion now seems to drop out of the
picture. The argument, rather, is that sex-selective abortion is a moral
wrong; that it would be a good thing if governments could prevent it; but
that the costs to all women of tightening access to abortion outweigh the
benefits of eliminating what may be only a tiny number of such abortions.
In recommending what she describes as a ‘grudging tolerance’ of possible
abuses of pre-natal diagnosis and existing abortion law, Saharso seems to
have wrapped up the normative issues to her satisfaction (in ways that are
pretty close to the Dutch consensus), and moves us onto the terrain of
pragmatic rather than normative debate.
My concern is that contextualizing morality isn’t necessarily the same as
being pragmatic; and that while both are important, I’d like to be a lot
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clearer about how they relate. There may be all kinds of pragmatic reasons
against introducing new laws or policy directives that have little or nothing
to do with normative issues. It may be, for example, that legislating against
a particular practice drives it underground and makes it harder than ever to
detect; it may be (as in the case discussed here) that it proves impossible to
restrict a practice without restricting other practices no one intended to
curtail; or it may just be that the costs of policing a new law take away
resources from policing an older one. It helps to know whether the objec-
tions are normative or pragmatic, if only because these require different
kinds of solution; and my own preference is to separate out the issues that
need to be addressed in determining what justice requires from those to be
addressed in determining which policy mechanisms will best achieve this. In
her otherwise compelling treatment of the issue of sex-selective abortion,
Saharso mixes up the ‘moral’ and ‘non-moral’ considerations in ways that
make this more difficult to do. Oddly, the effect is that she ends up with a
more exclusively pragmatic argument than seemed to be implied at the start.
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The morality of freedom and the patriarchal
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One of the important and welcome aims of Saharso’s sensitive treatment of
sex-selective abortion (SSA) is to question the oppositions often assumed
in political theory between ‘tradition’ and ‘modernity’, and between
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